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A QUARTER CENTURY LATER: REVISITING
DEFAMATION IN NEW MEXICO
PHILIP R. HIGDON* & ABIMAN RAJADURAI**
INTRODUCTION
According to a complaint filed in Bernalillo County, an Albuquerque attorney
contacted a reporter for the Albuquerque Journal concerning University of New
Mexico Head Football Coach Michael Locksley. During that communication, the
lawyer allegedly told the reporter that Coach Locksley had fired her client, a former football administrative assistant, “because she was not a ‘young gal’ who could
entice recruits.”1 The complaint further alleged that this and similar statements
“were made with the sole purpose to force a settlement or early resolution to [the
former administrator’s] EEOC claim.”2
The Journal published a front page article reporting the attorney’s alleged remarks.3 The very next day, Coach Locksley filed a suit for defamation against not
the Journal, but rather against the lawyer and her client.4 This lawsuit illustrates
several reasons why defamation can be a fun area of the law to follow: it can involve both locally prominent people and issues that are literally off the front page
of the newspaper. Moreover, if it had gone anywhere, the case would have
presented some classic libel issues (Were the lawyer’s alleged comments privileged
from a defamation claim? To what extent would the lawyer be held responsible for
the republication of her alleged remarks by the newspaper?) and some rather
novel ones (Can a client be liable for conspiring with her lawyer to commit libel?).
Alas, this case was evidently resolved by the parties fairly quickly,5 so that these
and other questions raised by this complaint went unanswered. Nonetheless, the
case illustrates that defamation claims are alive and well in New Mexico and can
present challenging issues.
In 1984, an author of this article published an article in the New Mexico Law
Review that summarized the state of defamation law in New Mexico up to then,
and posed questions to be addressed by New Mexico courts in the future.6 Perhaps
not surprisingly, all of those questions have not been answered in the quarter century since that article was published. In fact, developments in New Mexico defamation law have been rather limited. However, as this article notes in Part I, a new set
of uniform jury instructions provides depth and coverage to the common law of

* Partner, Perkins Coie LLP, Member of Arizona and New Mexico Bars; J.D., University of Texas
Law School, 1972; M.A., University of Kansas, 1970; B.S., University of Kansas, 1969.
** Associate, Perkins Coie LLP, Member of Arizona Bar; J.D., University of Michigan, 2008; A.B.
University of Michigan, 2005.
1. Complaint for Defamation, Defamation Per Se, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Civil
Conspiracy, Prima Facie Tort and Punitive Damages [hereinafter “Locksley Complaint”] ¶ 13(a), Locksley v.
Warner, No. D-202-CV-200909659 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 2009).
2. Id. ¶ 14.
3. Greg Archuleta, Lawyer: Locksley Wanted Pretty Office Girls, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 17, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 16000778.
4. Locksley Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Locksley Files Defamation Suit
Against Lawyer, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.sportingnews.com/college-football/article/2009-08-19/locksley-filesdefamation-suit-against-lawyer (last visited May 1, 2010).
5. ESPN.com, EEOC Complaint Resolved for New Mexico Coach Mike Locksley, http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4554794 (last visited May 5, 2010).
6. Philip R. Higdon, Defamation in New Mexico, 14 N.M. L. REV. 321 (1984).
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defamation claims. Nonetheless, New Mexico’s appellate courts have struggled
with uncertainties left to them by federal precedent, especially in issues involving
privileges and defenses. Part II discusses actions taken by New Mexico’s appellate
courts to develop and refine defenses and privileges in defamation in the wake of
new federal interpretations. Finally, Part III speculates on what developments to
expect in New Mexico law in the next quarter century.
I. ELEMENTS OF A DEFAMATION ACTION
The common law elements of a defamation claim7 have not changed since 1984.
However, New Mexico cases today reference the New Mexico Statutes Annotated
Civil Uniform Jury Instructions (UJI) 13-1001 to 13-10014 (and more specifically
UJI 13-1002).8 The UJI lists the elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a
defamation action, as follows:
(1) The defendant published the communication; and
(2) The communication contains a statement of fact; and
(3) The communication was concerning the plaintiff; and
(4) The statement of fact was false; and
(5) The communication was defamatory; and
(6) The person[s] receiving the communication understood it to be defamatory; and
(7) The defendant [knew the communication was false or negligently failed
to recognize that it was false] [or] [acted with malice]; and
(8) The communication caused actual injury to the plaintiff’s reputation;
and
(9) The defendant abused or [its] privilege to publish the communication.9

The Uniform Jury Instructions, since their adoption, have been utilized by attorneys to formulate their cases and by the courts to determine whether a defamation
claim exists.10
II. DEFENSES TO DEFAMATION ACTION
While the elements of a defamation claim have not materially changed since
1984, New Mexico’s appellate courts and legislature have been at work in developing and refining defenses and privileges in defamation cases. Two particular as7. “The elements of defamation include a defamatory communication published by the defendant, to
a third person, of an asserted fact, of and concerning the plaintiff, and proximately causing actual injury to the
plaintiff.” Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., Inc., 108 N.M. 801, 806, 780 P.2d 627, 632 (1989); see also Trujillo v.
City of Albuquerque, 211 F. App’x 670, 671–72 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Clough, 108 N.M. at 806, 780 P.2d at
632); Higdon, supra note 6, at 322.
8. See Clough, 108 N.M. at 806, 780 P.2d at 632; Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 429,
773 P.2d 1231, 1236 (1989).
9. UJI 13-1002 NMRA 2008 (brackets indicating optional parts omitted).
10. Moore v. Sun Publ’g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 379, 881 P.2d 735, 739 (Ct. App. 1994) (“As the parties
note, our Supreme Court has adopted new Uniform Jury Instructions covering the law of libel and slander.
The parties based their arguments on the new Uniform Jury Instructions, and in ruling on the motion for
summary judgment the district court relied on those instructions.”) (citation omitted); Cowan v. Powell, 115
N.M. 603, 604, 856 P.2d 251, 252 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing UJI 13-1002 and 13-1010 to determine damages
issue resulting from defamation action); Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 339, 785 P.2d 242, 250 (Ct. App.
1989) (citing UJI 13-1003 and 13-1009 to provide framework for how to determine whether appellant has
proven defamation claim).
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pects of privilege have merited the most attention. The first addresses the sources
of information on which a defamation defendant may rely to claim an absolute
privilege from liability. The second concerns whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of opinion, and thus protected, or fact, and thus subject to liability.
A. Absolute and Qualified Privileges
While “[t]he traditional rule in New Mexico is that truth is an affirmative defense to an action for defamation,”11 it is not the only way defendants can protect
themselves from liability. In New Mexico, amongst other available defenses, claiming “[a]n absolute or unqualified privilege means absolute immunity from liability
for defamation.”12 The absolute privilege applies to protect those “few situations in
which there is an obvious policy in favor of complete freedom of expression regardless of the defendant’s motives.”13 Absolute privilege specifically protects
statements made in judicial proceedings14 or simply those proceedings which are
related to achieving the objects of litigation.15 This privilege also protects comments made during quasi-judicial proceedings, such as administrative actions,16 and
also certain communications made within the executive branch of government.17
Because the Locksley action has been resolved, it is unknown what defenses the
defendant’s attorney may have pursued to avoid defamation liability. The alleged
defamatory statements upon which Locksley based his claim against the attorney
were apparently details of an age discrimination and sexual harassment complaint
related to a lawsuit filed against Locksley by a former football administrative assistant.18 Perhaps the most evident defense available for the defendant’s attorney to
assert would have been that her comments were absolutely privileged because,
even though it appears her statements were made outside of a courtroom, they
were made in the course of judicial proceedings.

11. Newberry, 108 N.M. at 430, 773 P.2d at 1237; see also NMRA, Civ. UJI 13-1013 (“Truth is a defense
to this action.”).
12. Neece v. Kantu, 84 N.M. 700, 705, 507 P.2d 447, 452 (Ct. App. 1973).
13. Baker v. Bhajan, 117 N.M. 278, 281, 871 P.2d 374, 377 (1994).
14. See Superior Constr., Inc. v. Linnerooth, 103 N.M. 716, 719, 712 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1986) (observing
that a notice of lis pendens was “merely a republication of the pleadings filed in the pending judicial proceeding and it should enjoy the same absolute privilege accorded those proceedings”).
15. Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474, 477, 513 P.2d 717, 720 (Ct. App. 1973) (“It is not absolutely essential, in order to obtain the benefits of absolute privilege, that the language claimed to be defamatory be spoken
in open court or contained in a pleading, brief, or affidavit. If the alleged defamatory statement is made to
achieve the objects of the litigation, the absolute privilege applies even though the statement is made outside
the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is invoked.”) (citation and quotations omitted);
Penny v. Sherman, 101 N.M. 517, 520, 684 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that statements made in
relation to “an ongoing or contemplated judicial proceeding” could receive absolute privilege protection); but
see Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, L.L.C. v. Glenn’s Water Well Serv., Inc., 2008-NMCA-101, ¶ 19, 191 P.3d 548,
554 (denying absolute privilege defense as to particular communications because they were made at a time
well before litigation was seriously contemplated).
16. Hollars v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 110 N.M. 103, 108, 792 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The parties
agree that any statements made during the formal hearings conducted by the Company and the Special Adjustment Board were absolutely privileged.”).
17. Baker, 117 N.M. at 281, 871 P.2d at 377.
18. See Locksley Files Defamation Suit Against Lawyer, supra note 4.
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While “‘[t]he application of an absolute privilege is confined to very few situations,’ qualified privileges apply to a broader array of circumstances.”19 The qualified privilege serves to protect those communications which consist “of a good
faith publication in the discharge of a public or private duty.”20
In Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, the defendant sought application of the qualified
privilege to protect comments made to two government entities involving a slander
of title action.21 There, the comments were not absolutely privileged even though
they involved an administrative agency because the court found that the permit
application process was not a quasi-judicial proceeding.22 The court adopted the
reasoning found in the Restatement23 to determine whether to invoke a qualified
privilege. The Restatement recommends a two-step process. First, the analysis considers the publisher’s viewpoint by stating that protection applies if the publisher
had a sufficiently important interest at stake and the receiver of the statement
would need the information to protect that interest.24 Second, section 598 of the
Restatement provides a standard from the recipient’s perspective, stating that the
communication is conditionally privileged if the communication contains information affecting an important public interest, and that interest requires communication of the information to an individual authorized to take action if the information
is true.25 Under both sections, the analysis of the qualified privilege requires “evaluation of the audience and the apparent utility of the communications.”26 Thus, in
Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, this prong was satisfied as the recipients of the alleged
defamatory statements, the Federal Bureau of Land Management and New Mexico Office of the State Engineer, were entities in a position to affect the interest at
issue.27
The process for determining the application of the qualified privilege, however,
does not end after this “Restatement” inquiry. After the elements required by the
“publisher-recipient” analysis are deemed satisfied, there must be a finding that
the privilege was not abused.28 Abuse of privilege can occur if the publisher lacks
belief that the communication was true, if the publication of the information is for
an improper use, or if the publisher provides the statement to a recipient who is
not in a position to accomplish the purpose behind the statement.29 Thus, in Greg19. Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, 2008-NMCA-101, ¶ 25, 191 P.3d at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting
Baker, 117 N.M. at 281, 871 P.2d at 377); see also Hagebak v. Stone, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶ 17, 61 P.3d 201, 206
(“Traditionally, New Mexico courts have been very circumspect in recognizing absolute privilege.”).
20. See UJI 13-1012 NMRA; Hagebak, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶ 13, 61 P.3d at 205.
21. Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, 2008-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 17–19, 191 P.3d at 554.
22. Id. ¶ 22, 191 P.3d at 555 (“Although we may reasonably assume that the permit applications precipitated some sort of administrative activity, we find no indication in the record that quasi-judicial proceedings
took place” and “therefore decline . . . to extend an absolute privilege to the communications at issue in this
case. . . .”).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594, 598 (1977).
24. Gregory Rockhouse Ranch, 2008-NMCA-101, ¶ 26, 191 P.3d at 555 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977)).
25. Id. ¶ 27, 144 N.M. at 697–98, 191 P.3d at 555–56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598
(1977)).
26. Id. ¶ 31, 191 P.3d at 556.
27. Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 191 P.3d at 556 (noting that the Federal Bureau of Land Management controlled the
federal land at issue in the case while the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer administered all the water
rights throughout New Mexico).
28. Id. ¶ 33, 191 P.3d at 557 (citing Baker v. Bhajan, 117 N.M. 278, 283, 871 P.2d 374, 379 (1994)).
29. Id. ¶ 33, 191 P.3d at 557.
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ory Rockhouse Ranch, to claim qualified privilege protection, the defendant had to
prove not only that the communications affected public or private interests, but
also that the privilege was not abused and the parties who received the communications were appropriate audiences.30 Ultimately, the court granted qualified privilege protection because the comments were made out of the public’s interest,
made to an appropriate agency to affect a change regarding protection of that interest, and the privilege was not abused.31
The corporate and employer-employee contexts provide a greater amount of
substantive development concerning qualified privilege during the last twenty-five
years. In 1984, through the qualified privilege, a former employer was immune
from damages in a slander suit when the alleged defamatory statements arose out
of an inquiry addressed to the former employer concerning an employee’s job capabilities.32 This protection continues today,33 and New Mexico has enacted a statute furthering efforts to promote employer disclosure while simultaneously
protecting employers from defamation actions. Under that statute,
When requested to provide a reference on a former or current employee,
an employer acting in good faith is immune from liability for comments
about the former employee’s job performance. The immunity shall not apply when the reference information supplied was knowingly false or deliberately misleading, was rendered with malicious purpose or violated any
civil rights of the former employee.34

Davis v. The Board of County Commissioners addressed an issue that is the
reverse of a defamation action: Do former employers owe a duty to prospective
employers to reveal unfavorable information about an applicant? In Davis, supervisors at a detention center had provided favorable reviews for a former employee
with a history of sexual harassment complaints.35 After being hired at another hospital (whose decision to hire the former employee was based in part on the supervisors’ favorable reviews), the employee was accused of engaging in sexual assault
and other acts of sexual harassment.36 In a negligent hiring case brought against the
second hospital, the court ruled that it would impose a common-law duty upon
employers to disclose certain information.37 The court adopted the commentary
found in section 311 of the Restatement38 concerning negligent misrepresentation
of information involving the risk of physical harm and how it applied “to an em30. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 191 P.3d at 557.
31. Id. ¶¶ 30–32, 35, 191 P.3d at 556–57.
32. See Gengler v. Phelps, 92 N.M. 465, 468, 589 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that doctor’s
comments concerning a former employee nurse-anesthesiologist were protected by the qualified privilege because “even though the oral publication may be of some harm to an anesthetist,” hospitals are “vitally interested in the qualifications of anesthetists whose conduct may affect the life or health of its patients”).
33. See Davis v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 1999-NMCA-110, ¶ 29, 987 P.2d 1172, 1181 (“New Mexico’s
common law reflects . . . a policy of encouraging employer disclosure by recognizing a ‘qualified or conditional privilege [against a defamation claim] to make statements about its employee or former employee if for
a proper purpose and to one having a legitimate interest in the statements.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Baker, 117 N.M. at 282, 871 P.2d at 378)).
34. NMSA 1978, § 50-12-1 (1995).
35. Davis, 1999-NMCA-110, ¶¶ 8–9, 987 P.2d at 1176.
36. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 987 P.2d at 1175.
37. Id. ¶ 31, 987 P.2d at 1182.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
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ployer’s duty of care in making employment references and the circumstances
under which that duty extends to foreseeable third parties.”39 The Davis court
found that these principles were “harmonious with the general propositions of
New Mexico law that govern duty of care and duty to third parties.”40 However, at
the same time, the court desired to offer protection to those former employers by
stating that, “[w]hen physical harm by the employee is foreseeable, the employer
who discloses will be protected against defamation by the qualified privilege.”41
The court recognized that this duty could silence employers from providing referrals, as overly cautious employers could be “deterred unnecessarily from volunteering helpful information and elect to remain silent” rather than provide a
reference and fear future litigation.42 The court noted that “[i]n the face of silence
from a former employer, the prospective employer [could] still conduct its own
investigation” and thus silence was better than misleading information because if a
former employer were to provide misleading information, the prospective employer may “relax its own guard” and not thoroughly investigate the candidate.43
Despite acknowledging that overly cautious employers could forego providing a
reference at all in light of this duty, the court provided that “the policy gains of
imposing a duty not to misrepresent under these limited circumstances” upon
those who did offer references would outweigh any potential negative consequences of inhibiting employer disclosure.44
While the freshly minted statutory protection may have limited lawsuits concerning employer-employee reference disputes, other new issues have arisen concerning the qualified privilege in the workplace. In 2002, a New Mexico court
analyzed whether to adopt the intracorporate communication exception recognized in other jurisdictions.45 The intracorporate communication exception held
that “communications among the employees, officers, or agents of a corporation
[were] not ‘published,’ because they do not extend beyond the corporation.”46
In the New Mexico case, Hagebak v. Stone, a psychologist who was terminated
from his position at the Los Alamos Family Council, was denied reinstatement to
his post after another employee of the Council, Stone, provided testimony largely
critical against Hagebak at a grievance hearing.47 Hagebak brought a defamation
action against Stone for her critical comments. The district court granted summary
judgment against Hagebak’s defamation claim, finding that Stone’s statements
were not published because they were intracorporate communications made by

39. Davis, 1999-NMCA-110, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d at 1179.
40. Id.
41. Id. ¶ 31, 987 P.2d at 1182.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Hagebak v. Stone, 2003-NMCA-007, 61 P.3d 201 (2002).
46. Id. ¶ 6, 61 P.3d at 204 (citing Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995)
(applying Oklahoma law); see also Lovelace v. Long John Silver’s, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (“[C]ommunications between officers of the same corporation in the due and regular course of the
corporate business, or between different offices of the same corporation, are not publications to third persons.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); M & R Inv. Co. v. Mandarino, 103 Nev. 711, 716, 748 P.2d 488, 491
(1987) (finding that no claim for defamation could exist because “[t]he communication of the allegedly defamatory statement between Mennie and Cooper, both employees of M & R, is not publication”).
47. Hagebak, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶ 2, 61 P.3d at 203.
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Stone to other employees and agents of the corporation within the scope of her
duties at the council.48 The appellate court recognized that “New Mexico courts
[had] not previously discussed whether to recognize this exception under New
Mexico law” and examined the intracorporate exception by balancing the pros and
cons of introducing the concept into New Mexico law.49 While, on the one hand,
the intracorporate communication exception would support public policy by allowing corporations to “communicate internally in a free and candid manner,”50
protecting all intra-corporate communication could be overbroad, as “[f]alse statements knowingly made, even malicious lies disseminated with devastating effect . . . would be] protected on an equal plane with statements innocently made
in the best interest of the corporation.”51
After extensive deliberation,52 the court ultimately declined “to adopt the intracorporate communication exception as an absolute bar to a lawsuit for defamation.”53 Instead, the court favored the “qualified-privilege approach that affords
substantial protection to the corporation, while at the same time preserving defamation remedies for the worst kind of abuse that causes unprivileged injury to
reputation.”54
From a theoretical standpoint, this decision seems to balance the needs of corporate entities with those of private citizens. However, as a practical matter, the
decision creates issues of fact that will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis. Was the statement false? Was it knowingly made? Was it maliciously made?
Was it injurious? Hagebak tells us there will be no absolute protection in these
cases and that these sub-issues will have to be addressed in each case.
B. Fact Versus Opinion
One of the other defenses receiving attention in New Mexico in recent years
concerns the distinction between statements of fact and opinion. As a general matter, a defamation action “lies only for statements of fact and not for statements of
opinion.”55 At one time, the line between “statements of fact” and “statements of
opinion” seemed pretty clear. However, in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court managed
to blur the distinction between the two, leaving courts in New Mexico (and other
courts across the country) with the task of applying a less than clear standard.
In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the
key distinction in the treatment between opinion and fact:

48. See id. ¶ 7, 61 P.3d at 204.
49. Id. ¶ 6, 61 P.3d at 204.
50. Id. ¶ 10, 61 P.3d at 205.
51. Id. ¶ 15, 61 P.3d at 206.
52. See id. ¶¶ 5–22, 61 P.3d at 203–08; id. ¶ 20, 61 P.3d at 207 (“Although the lack of an absolute
intracorporate communication exception may expose corporations to defamation liability, thereby affecting
insurance rates and operating costs, that cost may properly be considered part of the price of accountability in
a free and responsible society.”).
53. Id. ¶ 22, 61 P.3d at 208.
54. Id.
55. Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 533, 746 P.2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Moore v. Sun Publ’g
Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 381, 881 P.2d 735, 741 (Ct. App. 1994) (“The legal decision that a particular statement is
‘opinion’ makes the statement absolutely nonactionable, even though it might well remain defamatory. . . .”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues.56

Following Gertz, the Court had opportunities to clarify the protection given to
statements of opinion. Rather than seize the opportunity, the Court muddied the
waters by its decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.57 There, a high school
wrestling coach pursued a defamation action after the local newspaper published
an article concerning the coach’s testimony in court. The coach alleged that the
article accused him of committing perjury, “an indictable offense in the State of
Ohio,” and thus “damaged [him] directly in his lifetime occupation of coach and
teacher, and constituted libel per se.”58 Specifically, the coach complained of comments in the article such as: “Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from
Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich
and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth.”; “If you’re successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere
enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of
what really happened.”; and “[The lesson] is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie
your way out.”59 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment against
the coach, in part, finding the article to contain opinion, rather than statements of
fact.60
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the notion that “an additional separate constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’ is required to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”61 The Court reasoned that the Gertz dictum,
quoted above,62 was not meant to be a “wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’”63 Thus, the Court’s key inquiry was to determine whether “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the statements in
the . . . column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a
judicial proceeding.”64
The Court ruled that the comments at issue were not statements of opinion, but
instead could be read as statements of fact by the average reader.65 The Court held
that the language the author utilized was “not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously
maintaining that [the coach] committed the crime of perjury.”66 Further, because

56. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (footnote omitted).
57. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
58. Id. at 6–7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Supra, note 56 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 21.
65. See id. (“We . . . think the connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to
be susceptible of being proved true or false.”).
66. Id.
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the author’s comments could be verified by comparing the transcripts of the OHSAA hearing and the trial court testimony, the Court held that “[u]nlike a subjective assertion the averred defamatory language is an articulation of an objectively
verifiable event.”67 Thus, while the Court had the opportunity to provide full protection to statements of opinion and tip the balance of doubt in favor of free expression, it declined to do so and instead left a vague standard open to the
interpretations of various courts across the country.
New Mexico courts have been “guided” in this area by UJI section 13-1004.
That section, entitled “Statement of fact: Fact defined; opinion contrasted,”
provides:
To support a claim for defamation, the communication by defendant
must contain a statement of fact.
In contrast, statements of opinion alone cannot give rise to a finding of
defamation.
[However, an opinion which implies that it is based upon the existence
of undisclosed facts is the same as a statement of fact.]
In deciding whether the communication is or contains a statement of
fact, you should consider the following:
(A) The entirety of the communication and the context in which the
communication was made; and
(B) Whether reasonable persons would be likely to understand the
communication to be a statement of the defendant’s opinion or a statement
of fact.68

Section 13-1004 of the UJI does its best to follow the murky dictates of the
Milkovich decision, but simply reading it suggests how lost jurors are likely to be in
their attempts to apply the law given them. In analyzing these factors, New Mexico’s courts have focused on the location of a communication to determine
whether the statement was fact or opinion. For example, courts have specifically
acknowledged that placement within an editorial section will help support the finding that the defamatory statements are opinions.69 Moreover, New Mexico recognizes “verifiability as the controlling element in determining whether a statement
is fact or opinion.”70 Thus, opinions are those “statements which cannot be proved
or disproved.”71
Even with these attempts to clarify the standard, New Mexico courts recognize
that “‘[n]o task undertaken under the law of defamation is any more elusive than

67. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See UJI § 13-1004 NMRA (brackets in original).
69. See Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 723, 764 P.2d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 1988) (“In
considering the ‘entirety’ requirement, the published statement must be read in context. First, the column here
was situated on the ‘Opinion’ page of the newspaper along with four other articles and an editorial cartoon.
Readers of the opinion-editorial page generally expect to read the columnist’s views and opinions as opposed
to factual news stories.”); Andrews v. Stallings, 119 N.M. 478, 485, 892 P.2d 611, 618 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he
statement was advanced in an editorial context, which indicated that it was a forum for the expression of
opinion, not the recitation of fact.”).
70. Moore v. Sun Publ’g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 382, 881 P.2d 735, 742 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
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distinguishing between [fact and opinion].’”72 Moving forward, the best advice to
practitioners in this area may be merely to reassert the obvious. That is, when
analyzing the sustainability of the opinion defense, or trying to overcome it, carefully examine the placement of a communication, its tone and temperament, and
then make an educated guess as to what the average reader may conclude.
III. GOING FORWARD
The developments in defamation law in New Mexico have contained few surprises, and some results, such as the virtual elimination of the substantive distinctions between libel and slander, were easily predicted.73
The upheaval in defamation law created by the torrent of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in the sixties, seventies, and eighties has quieted. As a result, New Mexico and, presumably, many other states have had less occasion to review their own
rulings, especially in the constitutional arena, in light of the relatively few developments at the federal level. It may be that the mere passage of time, along with
changes in personnel on the U.S. Supreme Court, will result in a review of defamation law principles that have been relatively static for a while. Until that occurs, it
is likely that changes to the law of defamation at the state as well as federal level
will be an evolutionary process, not revolutionary.

72. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § IV.2, at 155 (1st ed. 1980)).
73. See Higdon, supra note 6, at 321; Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 429, 773 P.2d 1231,
1236 (1989) (“The lines of demarcation between slander (an oral communication) and libel (a written communication), subcategories of defamation, have become sufficiently blurred that we agree there are good reasons
for abolishing the distinction between [them].”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

